Prelude to the Revolution:
POWER, STATE, AND THE PEOPLE

Mohamad Tavakoli-Targhi <m.tavakoli@utoronto.ca>

Introduction

            Pre-twentieth century Iranian rulers have often been viewed as typical "Oriental Despots".^[1] An "Oriental Despot" is viewed as the sole possessor of political power and as the site from which power emanates. Complementing this conception of power is a commonly held view that the state and religion in Iran constitute separate, independent, and antagonistic entities. In this chapter I will demonstrate that, contrary to the theories of Oriental Despotism, the Iranian rulers were not the sole possessors of power and that the repressive apparatuses alone did not constitute the state. I will explain that the pre-twentieth century Iranian state functioned through a combination of apparatuses of consensus and coercion. Apparatuses such as mosques, madrasas, maktabs, and the Shari‘ah courts provided crucial resources for the construction of legitimacy and consent. The "twinship of state and religion" constituted the core of the political imaginary. Religion was viewed as the foundation of the state, and the state as protector of religion. With the discursive equivalence of the state and religion, obedience and submission to the "will of God" were integrated into the overall strategy of power. The state was conceived as the protector of the territory of Islam, and the identity of social subjects was viewed as their religious identity. Opposition to the state was articulated as heresy and revolt against Islam. Religiosity of the state was an important mechanism through which social cohesion was produced.

The Symbolic Condensation of Power

            Despotism has been viewed for a long time as the distinguishing feature of Oriental governments. Aristotle in an often quoted statement pointed out that, "Barbarians are more servile by nature than Greeks, and Asians are more servile than Europeans; hence they endure despotic rule without protest. Such monarchies are like tyrannies, but they are secure because they are hereditary and legal."^[2] With the rise of Europe to a position of world power in the modern age, many thinkers such as Montesquieu, Machiavelli, Adam Smith, Hegel, Marx, Ricardo, and Engels made relatively similar observations about the nature of political power in the East.^[3] The view of the Eastern states as despotic was not an abstract construct of European philosophers. Many Europeans who visited the "Orient" also drew a vivid image of oriental despotism. For example John Malcolm writing in 1829 stated that, "The Monarch of Persia has been pronounced to be one of the most absolute in the world; and it has been shown that there is reason to believe that his condition has been the same from the earliest ages."^[4] Lord Curzon writing in 1892 stated that, "The King may do what he pleases; his word is law. The saying that 'the law of the Medes and Persians altereth not' was merely an ancient periphrasis of the absolutism of the sovereign...In his person are fused the threefold functions of government, legislative, executive, and judicial. No obligation is imposed upon him beyond the outward observation of the national religion. He is the pivot upon which turns the entire machinery of public life."^[5] 

            While Asiatic in geographical setting, and despotic in form, the relation of power in pre-twentieth century Iran does not correspond to the various models of Asiatic despotism in which power is supposed to emanate from a single source. In most Orientalist depictions of the government in Iran, the Shah was presented as the source of power. But as Brian Turner has pointed out, "The image of powerful, centralized and despotic bureaucracy is part of the mythology of Oriental Despotism which has been handed down from Montesquieu to Wittfogel and which can play no part in the sociological analysis of Iranian social formation."^[6] 

            Due to climatic and geographical specificity, the Iranian social formation was built upon divergent urban, rural, and nomadic modes of life, and the corresponding organizations of economy, the urban market, agriculture and pastoralism. The topography of the social formation was conditioned by the availability of water. Where there was no water there was no abadi and no settled organization of life. The importance of water in the growth and development of the society has been so important that ab, the Persian word for water, is the root of such important words as abad (cultivated and improved), abadi (flourishing, village), abadani (development, flourishment), and biyaban (desert).^[7] The availability of water circumscribed the terminal points of sedentary modes of life. Unlike most of Western Europe, the agricultural land in Iran was not in the form of unbroken and extensive plains, but dispersed parcels of arable lands. Due to the shortage of water, artificial irrigation has been essential for agricultural development. Unlike Egypt, India, and China, Iran did not possess large rivers such as the Nile, Sind and Huang Ho which provided a highly centralized source of irrigation. Due to the lack of rainfall and shortage of water, artificial irrigation was a very important prerequisite for the organization of communities in Iran. The manually constructed underground water conduits called qanat or kahriz provided the necessary water for cultivation of land in Iran for many centuries. Unlike river irrigation which is a relatively centralized form of water distribution, qanats are a highly decentralized and dispersed form of irrigation. Although control and distribution of water was an important element in the centralization of the state in other countries, this could not have been the case in Iran. Qanats were not centralized but dispersed sources of water around which communities were established, lands were brought under cultivation, and villages, towns, and cities were erected. The mobile nomadic tribes which utilized the natural resources lying between two points of human settlements were often the only link between the settled communities.

            This diversity, dispersity, and fragmentation of the society conditioned the prevalence of religion and nasab (blood relations) as two important mechanisms of power. Due to the scarcity of resources, it was not economically feasible for the state to be directly present at every locus of the society. The 'precarious agrarian state' did not have the economic and financial resources to develop extensive bureaucratic and repressive apparatuses.^[8] The agents of the central government were not directly present in dispersed and isolated villages and towns. Due to the dispersity of the society, political power, contrary to the dominant image of 'Oriental Despotism', was not concentrated in the hands of the monarchs or the state. There was no single locus of power. Power was everywhere and so were the loci of resistance. No government could stand the chance of survival without anchoring itself to the local centers of power.

            Eventhough the Iranian state lacked an extensive bureaucracy and a significant standing army, it can not be concluded that the rulers were "despots without the instruments of despotism."^[9] In addition to the army and bureaucracy there were other mechanisms of power that played an important role in the maintenance of social cohesion. To bring these mechanisms to light it is necessary to recognize that the state is not limited to repressive apparatuses (i.e. the army, the police, the prisons, and etc.). Apparatuses which do not necessarily function by violence (i.e., the educational, the legal, the administrative, the cultural, and the political apparatuses) play a crucial role in maintaining social cohesion, organizing the dominant and disorganizing the dominated classes. Non-repressive apparatuses play a crucial role in making possible the establishment of the intellectual, moral, and the political leadership necessary for any form of domination and subordination. The cohesion of the social formation in Iran was not established through bureaucratic concentration of power. It was made possible with the discursive articulation of the state and religion, or "throne and the pulpit" as twin brothers.^[10] Political despotism could not have been possible without the support of religious apparatuses and the moral backing of religious leaders.^[11] 

            Since ancient times state and religion have been conceived as twin brothers. Twinship of state and religion provided the imaginary for the political institution of the society. Tansar, a member of the high clergy of the Ardashir court in a letter to Gushtasb writes, "Religion and state were born of one womb, joined together and never to be sundered. Virtue and corruption, health and sickness are of the same nature for both."^[12] Religion was viewed as the foundation of the state, and the state as the guardian of religion.^[13] "The state has an absolute need of its foundation as religion absolutely needs its protector."^[14] This ancient Iranian view became an integral component of the Islamic political discourse. Al-Ghazali, the champion of Islamic orthodoxy had found this view so important that he regards it as a hadith.^[15] 

            The discursive equivalence of the state and religion provided the terrain for the harnessing of coercive apparatuses of the state to religious apparatuses. As such the state apparatuses were anchored to the clerical interests and the 'self-government' of the social subjects.^[16] By their own verity, social subjects followed the codes of behavior which were prescribed by religion and executed by the state. As such, the realm of the state expanded beyond its recognized structures into local centers of power/knowledge. Religious institutions such as mosques, maktabs, madrasas, and Shari‘ah courts which were the bases of the power of the ‘Ulama, Mujtahids, and Mullahs, functioned at the same time as the state apparatuses, apparatuses in which the dominant Islamic ideology was inscribed. With the linkage of the state and religion, obedience and submission to the will of God and observation of the Shari‘ah, and codes of behavior were integrated into the overall strategy of power. The religious laws complemented the laws of the state. As such, opposition to the state was equated with opposition to the religion, and religious opposition was articulated as opposition to the state.

            With the articulation of state and religion as twin brothers, any political, intellectual, or philosophical movement which threatened the cohesion of the dominant discourse was deemed as anti-Islamic. According to a classic formulation, "State and religion are twin brothers. Whenever disturbance breaks out in the country, religion suffers too; heretics and evil-doers appear; whenever religious affairs are in disorder, there is confusion in the country; evildoers gain power and render the Ruler impotent and despondent; heresy grows rife and rebels make themselves felt."^[17] Political dissidents were accused of heresy and of revolt against God, and all resources both repressive and ideological were mobilized to suppress them. Takfir and tafsiq, the ideological construction of opponents as infidels and immoral, were decisive weapons used by both the state and the clergy.^[18] Religiosity and piousness played the same function as the execution of heretics and apostates. The bloodiest form of subordination (the beheading of dissidents and revolutionaries discursively constructed as apostates and enemies of Islam) and the most peaceful form of submission (religiosity and piousness) expressed the same power relations. One brought about social cohesion through brute force, the other through religious and ideological conformity.

            In the dominant discourse, the Shah was constituted as the symbol of power and authority. He was viewed as the "shadow of God on Earth". In the absence of God the Shah was viewed as the pillar of society. Mirza Buzurg Qa’im Maqam (d. 1822) viewed the people as a tent, and the Shah as the pole that upheld the tent: "The tent stands upright from the stability of the pole, and it shifts as the pole shifts."^[19] Malik al-Mutakalimin, a Constitutionalist leader is quoted to have said," The Shah is the fixed pivot around which all apparatuses of the state operate. The people's trust and faith are what keeps the pivot firm and stable. Whenever that trust becomes uncertain, the apparatuses will collapse."^[20] It was based on this view that Malik al-Mutikalimin warned the Shah to keep his promise of establishing a Majlis during the Constitutional Revolution, otherwise, with the loss of popular support, he argued that the whole system of government would fall apart.

            Besides religion, blood was another important element in the cohesion of the social formation. Blood signified the political form of the sovereignty (monarchy), the transference of power (hereditary succession), and the chain of authority (nasab or blood relations).^[21] It also signified the sword and the right to shed blood. Since ancient times the shedding of blood has been viewed as an essential element in the maintenance of social order, prevention of chaos and disorder.^[22] The author of Marzban namah, a 10th century text, states that, "Lots of bloodshed is what prevents even more bloodshed."^[23] According to Sir John Malcolm the same views are reported to be the guiding principals in 19th century Iran: "We have hardly an instance of a king of Persia evincing any uncommon degree of humanity, while there are many to prove that the habit of shedding blood often becomes a passion; by a brutal indulgence in which, human beings appear to lose the rank and character of their species."^[24] The importance of repression and bloodshed can also be deduced from the terminologies of politics. Siyasat, the concept for politics, with the help of the action verbs kardan, farmudan, or rasandan gains the meaning of "to execute".^[25] The agent form of siyasat, siyasatgar, has a meaning equivalent to "the executioner." Control over the instruments of repression was essential in the arts of politics.^[26] 

            Though siyasatgari was an important component of politics, it was not sheer force, the right and the capacity to shed blood, that constituted the Shah as the symbolic condensation of power. In the dominant discourse Kingship was viewed as a sacred institution. The Shah was conceived as the possessor of farr-i izadi (divine effulgence), and the shadow of God on earth (Zill Allah fi al-arz).^[27] While the possession of the divine effulgence is of an ancient Iranian origin, it found its textual proof in the Qur’an: "Say O God, possessor of sovereignty, you give sovereignty to whomever you choose and take it from whomever you choose."^[28] The overthrow of one ruler and the rise to power of another was explained in term of dawlat, the divinely granted turn in power and not in the change in the alignment of forces.^[29] The term dawlat has a multitude of meanings ranging from "the state" and"happiness" to "turn of fortune." In Persian historiography the maintenance of dawlat, as both "fortune" and "the state" depends on the preservation of ‘adl/‘adalat (balance and justice). ‘Adalat, a key concept in Iranian/Islamic political discourse, does not have a fixed meaning. Its meaning ranges from equilibrium and maintenance of social order and status quo, to execution of the Shari‘ah. ‘Adalat was a key element in the Persian theory of government, the Circle of Justice (dayirah-’i ‘adalalat).^[30] According to this theory, stability and maintenance of the dawlat (State) depends on prosperity (abadani), and prosperity depends on the maintenance of justice (‘adl).^[31] ‘Adl/‘adalat meant both balance between the rich and poor and execution of the Shari‘a. The function of ‘adalat in the Circle of Justice was the construction of consensus and legitimacy. A just king (padishah-’i ‘adil) was responsible for defense of the religious orthodoxy, protection of the dar al-Islam (realm of Islam), and execution of the Shari‘ah.

            The "twinship of the state and religion" provided an imaginary for the institution of political discourse in pre-twentieth century Iran. As it will be explained later, this made possible the symbolic condensation of power in the person of the Shah. The Shah came to signify the point of intersection of repressive and ideological apparatuses of the state and the merging point of diverse sites of power.

The Shi‘i Imaginary

            With the rise of the Safavids to power in 1501, the twinship of state and religion found its clearest form of expression in Iranian political discourse. Arising in a general context of millenarian or Mahdist movements, the Safavid rulers established Twelver Shi‘ism as the religion of the state. On the day of the proclamation of Twelver Shi‘ism as the state religion in Tabriz (1501) Isma‘il, the founder of the Safavid Dynasty who was viewed as the forerunner of the Mahdi, "stood in front of the minbar (pulpit) holding the unleashed [sic] sword of the Lord of the Age."^[32] By establishing Shi‘ism as the religion of the state, the Safavids integrated into their discourse the millenarian political imaginary of Shi‘ism. Consequently, the Shi‘i imaginaries were constituted as the "creative core" accounting for the institution of social arrangements, myths, symbols, and traditions in Shi‘i Iran. They endowed Iranian society with an identity that distinguished it from other Islamic societies. Furthermore, they served both the actual and the symbolic purpose of internal integration and external segregation of Iran from the rest of the Muslim populated lands.

            The basic elements of Shi‘i discourse emerged as a result of a succession struggle after the death of Muhammad, the founder of an expanding Islamic empire. With the death of Muhammad in 632 A. D., Islamic society faced a succession crisis. Those forces and individuals who supported ‘Ali ibn ‘Abi fialib (d. 661) as the rightful successor of Muhammad became known as Shi‘at ‘Ali (partisans of ‘Ali). ‘Ali and his son Husayn provided the founding myths of Shi‘ism. In the Shi‘i symbolic order the period of ‘Ali's rule as the Caliph (656-661) has been constructed as an ideal period of the Islamic past, a lost utopia. Husayn, ‘Ali's son who was killed in the famous Battle of Karbala in 680 A.D., has been conceived as the symbol of resistance and opposition to unjust and tyrannic rule. His death or 'martyrdom' according to Michael Fischer has provided a basis for the emergence of an Islamic paradigm the focus of which is "the emotionally potent theme of corrupt and oppressive tyranny repeatedly overcoming (in the world) the steadfast dedication to pure truth; hence its ever-present latent, political potential to frame or clothe contemporary discontents."^[33]

            With the expansion of the Islamic Empire, the Umayyads (661-750) became increasingly concerned with the day to day administrative affairs of the state. The Shi‘is charged that the Umayyads had transformed the Caliphate into a kingship (mulk).^[34] "Because of the pagan associations of Kingship, the caliphs had always sought to disassociate themselves from this title."^[35] In the Shi‘i discourse the title of Caliph, which originally had both political and religious connotations, came to refer to the political realm alone. This was accompanied with the progressive transition of the title of the Khalifat rasul Allah to khalifat Allah, and later to the shortened and simplified title of Khalifa.^[36] While the title of khalifa was used to refer to the Sunni leaders of the Islamic empire, the Shi‘is instead used the imam which came to signify both political and religious authority. The concept of Imam meaning one who stands at the front , and the prayer leader, was transformed into a radical political imaginary. The imam and the khalifa became established as organizing elements of two contesting Islamic discourses: Sunnism and Shi‘ism. Consequently, in the Shi‘i political view, caliphate and imamate became constituted as two antagonistic forms of leadership in the Islamic political discourse. While the caliphate referred to the actual ruler of the Islamic Empire, imamate came to signify an imaginary Shi‘i leader (al-Mahdi) who was promised to appear at an undetermined time in the future.^[37] The Twelfth Shi‘i Imam, MuHammad ibn al-Mahdi, is believed to have gone into occultation (265/878) and is expected to return (raj‘) from occultation to fill the world with justice.

            There have been many Mahdist or millenarian type movements in the course of Islamic history in which a diverse ensemble of social forces gathered around an actual or imaginary Imam in opposition to the existing rulers, expecting the arrival of a new time.^[38] The idea of the Hidden Imam is an important component of the Shi‘i symbolic order.  The imaginary Imam has been the organizing element of many millenarian movements in Iran such as the Mar‘ashis, the Sarbadars, the Huryufiyahs, the Musha‘sha‘s and the Safavids.^[39] It is recorded that the Sarbidars used to send caparisoned horses to the gate of the city of Sabzivar every day to accommodate the expected Mahdi.^[40]  

            At the time of the Safavids' rise to power, a large majority of the population in Iran were Sunni Muslims. The Safavids managed to transform the religious topography of the society by converting the population to Shi‘ism, which was made possible through a combination of sheer force and intense ideological propagation.^[41] According to Minorsky, the Safavids' conversion policy antagonized Iranian clerics and led to their subsequent persecution and exile.^[42] In order to strengthen the ideological foundation of their government, the Safavids imported many learned shi‘is from Iraq, Bahrain and Syria.^[43] Among these scholars were individuals such Nur al-Din ‘Amili Karraki (d. 940), ‘Abd al-‘Ali Karrki, Baha’ al-Din ‘Amili (d. 1021), Husayn ‘Amili (d. 984), Ibn fiavvus Hilli, MuHaqqiq Hilli, Fakhr al-MuHaqqiqi Hilli, Shams al-Din ‘Amili, Ibn Maysam Bahrayni. The Shi‘i clerics were integrated into the structure of the state as Mullabashi, Sadr, Qazi, Shaykh al-Islam, Qazi ‘Askar, Mujtahid, Mullah, Pishnamaz, Khalifat al-Khulafa, Mu’azzin, Hafiz and Mudarris. The newly emerging Shi‘i clerics increasingly occupied the administrative, legal, judicial, educational, fiscal, educational and religious positions which were inseparable components of the Iranian state.^[44] Besides the existing religious institutions such as mosques, coffee houses of the Safavid period provided an important locus for construction and dissemination of a distinct Shi‘i identity. Shi‘i religious epics such as Amir Hamzah-’i SaHibqiran ^[45] and Husayn-i Kurd-i Shabistari were narrated widely in coffee houses.^[46] Oratory (sukhanvari) which evolved during this period was used effectively for the propagation of Shi‘ism.^[47] Because of the centrality of Shi‘ism in constitution of a new Iranian identity in this period, the ‘ulama developed a hostile and antagonistic attitude towards the pre-Islamic Iranian history and culture and narration of this history was viewed as bid‘at (innovation) and zalalat (deviation).^[48]

            Intensification of religious propaganda during this period had a long lasting effect on literature and prose. Although the influence of Arabic on Persian language predates the Safavids, it reached its peak during this period. Most theological and philosophical texts were written in Arabic. The thinking of the theologians who wrote in Persian was so deeply immersed in the Qur’an and the Sunna that their prose often followed the Arabic syntax.^[49] The syntactic influence of Arabic on the prose of the ‘ulama has continued to the present time.^[50] During the Constitutional revolution, ‘Ali Akbar Dihkhuda, in his famous satirical writings, Charand Parand, criticized the clerical prose as a strange language more resembling Hebrew than Persian.^[51] 

            With increased importance of Shi‘i clerics in the administrative affairs of the state, a large number of Arabic words and phrases were integrated into the political discourse.^[52] This can be easily ascertained from the historical texts such as AHsan al-Tavarikh (1577-8/985), ‘Alam Ara-yi ‘Abbasi (1616/1025), Durrah-‘i Nadiri, and Rustam al-Tavarikh. In many instances only prepositions and the general structure of sentences in these texts remained Persian.^[53] The deepening influence of Arabic on the Persian language is a clear indication of the importance of Shi‘ism and the Shi‘i clerics in the Safavid and post-Safavid Iranian politics.

            In the post-Safavid period Shi‘ism continued to provide the organizing elements of the dominant discourse and the bases for social and political organization. With the disintegration of the Safavid state and the rise of autonomous centers of power based on tribal military power, the religious establishment continued to provide the institutional basis for social cohesion. The decline in the power of the Court resulted in further expansion of clerical power. At a time when the central state did not have the resources for the maintenance of law and order, the Shi‘i ‘ulama came to play an important role in the cohesion of the social formation. This transition was facilitated with the domination of Usulis over Akhbaris in an important "doctrinal dispute" in late eighteenth century over the extent of the power of the ‘Ulama.^[54] The Usulis were calling for the establishment of the of Mujtahids (the possessors of ijtihad, or capability to issue religious verdicts) as loci of religious knowledge. This would involve localization of religious knowledge and establishment of autonomous sources of religious authority. The Akhbaris on the other hand opposed the decentralization of religious authority through the practice of ijtihad. With the defeat of the Akhbaris and the establishment of Usuli hegemony, the Mujtahids emerged as loci of religious and political authority. This also resulted in a sharp increase in the number of Mujtahids in Iran. While at the beginning of the nineteenth century there were only five Mujtahids in Iran, towards the end of the Qajar period, according to Willem Floor, "there were five mujtahids in Tabriz alone and about 100 all over Iran."^[55] The position of the Mujtahids as possessors of knowledge (‘alim) was strengthened by requiring believers to elect a Mujtahid as their guide in daily religious affairs.^[56] Under the Qajars, Mujtahids came to administer educational institutions, collect religious taxes, issue fatvas (religious verdicts), lead prayers, recruit their own private armies and execute the Shari‘a.^[57] For example the Imam Jum‘ah of Isfahan is said to have had five hundred frashes (hit-men), "who were the executive power of the Aqa."^[58] The Imam Jum‘ah of Tihran housed the lutis (rowdies), who often served as hit-men in the Shah Mosque.^[59] Aqa Najafi, a leading anti-constitutionalist mujtahid, had a large number of students (flalabah) who received regular salaries and "were present in the lecture hall for the execution of his orders."^[60] On the eve of the Constitutional Revolution, the city of Zanjan was under the direct control of a mujtahid named Mulla Qurban ‘Ali. Because of an incident leading to the punishment of one of his followers by the order of governor Sa‘d al-Dawlah, Mulla Qurban ‘Ali demanded the exile of the governor. According to Kasravi, Mulla Qurban ‘Ali "ruled without a crown and throne."^[61] By the late 19th century the Shi‘i clergy became established as an important component of the ruling power bloc and their realm of control extended far beyond the capital into the isolated towns and villages of Iran.^[62]

The Army of Islam and the Soldiers of Prayers

            Under the Qajars, the Shah, the clerics, and the military provided the crucial elements of the power bloc. God was viewed as the source of sovereignty. The Shah was articulated as zill Allah fi al-arZ (shadow of God on earth), the clerics as the ‘asakir-i du‘a (soldiers of prayer), and the military as lashkariyan-i Islam (the army of Islam).^[63] The 'army of Islam' constituted the coercive apparatus, the 'soldiers of prayer' the ideological apparatus, and the Shah signified condensation of both. The monarch, viewed as the "executive power of Islamic law," symbolized the junction of military coercion and religious consensus. The state and clergy were involved in a ventriloquial relationship. Depending on the specificity of the situation, their role as ventriloquists altered. Against its opponents, the state portrayed itself as the protagonist of Islam, and in the name of religious orthodoxy defended its basis of power. Against religious reformers the clergy called for the defence of the realm of Islam (dar al-Islam) from the incursion of non-believers (kuffar). This explains why the emergence of oppositional political movements in pre-twentieth century Iran almost always coincided with the emergence of 'heretical religious sects'. The political movements of the pre-twentieth century were always condemned as heretical movements. Treatment of oppositional movements as religious sects diverts attention from the political aspirations and demands of such movements and enables the state to suppress them without much popular reaction. This ability was the hallmark of a political vision based on the twinship of state and religion.

The Discursive Construction of the People

            Interpellative elements used to signify collective identity often reveal the underlying principles of social organization. These elements usually have vague and imprecise meanings and unstable political connotations. They are articulated in diverse discourses. In every discourse they gain different connotations and signify a divergent ensemble of social forces. The 'ummat,' the 'millat,' the 'people', and the 'nation' are illustrative of such interpellations.

             In most languages there are numerous concepts signifying a collective identity such as "the people". In the English language there are concepts such as 'masses', 'folk', and 'nation' which have connotations similar to the concept of 'the people'. Each of these concepts has a multiple layers of meanings which signify diverse alignments of social and class forces at different historical conjunctures.^[64] The meaning of "the people" has ranged from the universal sense of mankind,^[65] to the "common people" as distinguished from the nobility, to the electorate who constituted the "political nation"; and to the "laboring people," "poor people," "mere people".^[66] Even though the concept of the "nation" has gained a relatively fixed meaning now, in the 1930's and throughout the 1940's it had such an imprecise meaning that the editors of several encyclopedias such as International Encyclopedia, Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Encyclopaedia Britannica, and Handworterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, omitted the term 'nation' altogether.^[67] 

            The shift in the meaning of the people and the nation is an indication of a change in political imaginary and discourse. Prior to the integration of the Middle East into the expanding European capitalist system and the formation of nation-states in the 20th century, millat, a term signifying collective identity, referred to religious formations such as Jews, Christians, Mulims, and later Zoroastrians.^[68] The "revealed books" such as the Torah, Bible, and Qur’an were the nodal points around which ensembles of people, with socio-political identities such as Jew, Christian, Muslim, or Zoroastrians were organized. The millat not only signified the identity of the social subjects, but also an ensemble of discursive apparatuses (i. e. churches, mosques, maktabs, religious laws and courts) representing the institutional materiality of a specific millat. Without these material apparatuses a people could not gain the status of millat.

            As formations of peoples, millats could enter into different discourses and strategies of power. The non-Muslims could be articulated as the people of dar al-Harb (the realm of war), with an identity antagonistic to the Islamic identity. In such instances, even though the non-Muslims resided in the dar al-Islam (the territory dominated by Muslims), they were regarded as outsiders, as allies of non-Muslim states.^[69] Alternatively, the non-Muslim millats could be articulated as part of the Islamic community but with different social identities.^[70] For example, the Ottomans, after the 1453 conquest of Constantinople, allowed a larger field of autonomy first to the Greek Orthodox and later to Armenian, Jewish, and other millats. Through this policy the Ottomans hoped to integrate the non-Muslim millats into the Ottoman-Islamic-discourse of power and to neutralize their potential support for "Christian Europe." The leaders of millats (patriarches and rabbis) were granted relative autonomy from the central government in the internal organization of their millat/community. Their realm of autonomy came to encompass not only the responsibility of maintaining order and executing their respective religious laws, but also collecting taxes and functioning as intermediaries between their millats and the central government. The relative autonomy of the non-Muslim millats was essential for their neutralization and integration into the Ottoman-Islamic strategy of power. In the Ottoman discourse, the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims was transformed from a relationship of antagonism and equivalence into one of deferential identity, Jewish, Armenian, Christian millats living in a unified territory.

            The Safavids' establishment of Shi‘ism as the state religion in Iran affected the connotation of the concept of millat. While millat was used to refer to non-Muslim religious formations, it also came to signify the politico-religious identity of the people residing in Iran. The Safavid rulers established millat-i Shi‘i-i isna ‘ashari as the nodal point of a discursive formation, a discourse which made possible the ideological differentiation of Iran from the Ottoman-Islamic empire.^[71] By integrating into its discourse the millenarian political imaginary of the Shi‘i Ghulat, the Safavids also were able to neutralize the extremist movements.^[72] By establishing Shi‘ism as the "religion of the state," the Safavids incorporated in the service of the centralizing state a well-developed system of law and courts.^[73] In the post-Safavid Iran, like the period prior to it, religion was a crucial mechanism of power, and an important sign of social identity.^[74] The political institution of the society based on Shi‘i imaginary endowed 'the people' with a religiously specific identity.

            In the 19th century, through increased contacts and conflicts with the West the Shi‘i imaginary began to give way to a new political imaginary. The source of sovereignty was shifted from God to 'the people.' The people gained a new identity no longer limited by shi‘i religious identity. The clerical control over educational, legal, and administrative apparatuses of the state was undermined by a new social stratum, which was not educated in traditional madrasas but in Western and Western style schools. Knowledge (‘ilm) gained a non-religious meaning. A new relation of power and knowledge developed. These changes provided the terrain for the articulation of the Constitutionalist Discourse and the emergence of the Constitutional Revolution.